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Summary of Reply Arguments
Montague's brief is nothing more than a flood of
computer generated words, irrelevant cases, and spurious
interpretations iterated to confuse the court and drown in
the resulting flood the applicable fundamental principles of
the rule of law clearly iterated in Sew Easy's brief.
Montague does not deny that he obtained the original
default under the express false pre-text that Sew Easy had
been served with process and failed to appear and thus
subverted Sew Easy's right to notice and hearing before the
court on the issues related to default.

There is no denial

by Montague that the judge's failure to rule on motions
stifled prosecution; the judge was biased; the whole case,
including the counter-claim, should have been dismissed
under the scope of the court's

notice, not

just the

complaint dismissed; that the judge exceeded the notice by
converting the dismissal hearing into a default judgment
entry hearing without further notice; that the judge should
have ruled on objections and held an evidentiary hearing
before entering any default judgment in this tort counterclaim and that a timely appeal was filed within thirty days
from plaintiff's first receipt of actual or constructive
notice of judgment entry.
Montague has no valid answer to Sew Easy's arguments
and

law

that

every

one

of

1

these

procedural

facts

independently constitutes separate grounds for setting aside
the spurious counter-claim default judgment.
The statutes, rules and cases cited by Montague are
frequently irrelevant to these conceded

facts and are

inapposite to his conclusions when applied to these facts.
Most of the arguments give credibility to Sew Easy's expose'
of the spurious Cache County interpretive doctrine which
elevates self-serving official convenience over private
rights in interpreting rules and statutes.
REPLY TO POINT I
MONTAGUE'S CLAIM TO UNTIMELY APPEAL RESULTS FROM
GROSS MISCONSTRUCTION AND MISAPPLICATION OF RULE 52
A(d) U.R.C.P.
Defendant admits in his brief the relevant

facts

related to the entry of the October 26, 1988 counter-claim
default

judgment

and

the

lack

of

either

actual

or

constructive notice to plaintiff until the March 8, 1989
actual notice which clearly leads to the legal conclusion
that the notice of appeal filed on April 5, 1989 was timely.
(Montague's Brief pgs. 10 & 11).
Montague admits he never gave the notice of judgment
entry required by Rule 58 A(d) U.R.C.P.

Because plaintiff

first received actual or constructive notice on March 8,
1989

(R. 94) of the entry on October

counter-claim default judgment

2

26, 1988 of the

(R. 73-75), the notice of

appeal filed on April 5, 1989 (R. 94) was timely under due
process, the Utah case law and Rule 58 A(d) U.R.C.P.
The manifest error in Montague's basic conclusions of
untimely

appeal

arise

from

a

misinterpretation

and

misapplication to this case of U.R.C.P. Rule 58 A(d) which
reads as follows:
"(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The
prevailing party should promptly give notice of the
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties
and shall file proof of service of such notice with
the clerk of the court.
However, the time for
filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the
notice requirement of this provision.
Montague admits that he never gave this notice of entry
and has acknowledged his own surprise at discovering its
entry in February of 1989.

The key to the resolution of the

issue lies in an underlying due process requirement that a
right of appeal

from a default

judgment

against

one

(especially when he has appeared in the action) cannot run
and

expire

until

the

party

has

received

actual

or

constructive notice of the event either one of which starts
the clock running on his right of appeal.

Critical to Rule

58 A(d) interpretation and application here is that the last
sentence was added by a 1986 amendment to the first sentence
according to the amendment note.

No reported cases since

1986 aid in the amendment's interpretation.
The evolution of Rule 58 U.R.C.P. and the way it interrelates to all other rules and cases is complex as to when,
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under particular circumstances, the time clock

starts

running on appeal rights in light of due process notice and
constructive notice requirements.

In light of the due

process notice requirement, the only valid interpretation of
the last sentence of Rule 58 A(d) is precisely that the
appeal time clock will start running no later than the date
of giving of the specific notice in the specific form
prescribed in the first sentence of the rule.

The later

added last sentence simply articulates the pre-existing
state of the rules and case law that fixes the varying
circumstances construed which fix an earlier date at which
the appeal time clock starts running because of earlier
actual or constructive due process

conforming notice of

judgment entry, given in some other manner than that
provided in Rule 58 A(d) first sentence,
Montague concedes that he never gave the specific
notice prescribed in U.R.C.P. Rule 58 A(d) first sentence.
(Montague Brief paragraph 17 pg. 11.)

No appeal time clock

started running under that specific rule.
counsel's affidavit

in the record

Sew Easy's

acknowledges

actual

discovery on March 8, 1989 by examining the record (R. 76).
The appeal notice was filed on April 4, 1989 well within the
30 day limit from the date of actual notice.

The only

remaining possibility for defeating appellate jurisdiction
under due process requirements would be if in conformity
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with due process as it sifts out under the Utah statutes,
rules and case law, there was constructive notice of entry
given to Sew Easy prior to 30 days before the notice of
appeal was filed on April 5, 1989.

The record clearly

reflects an outrageous case of multiple violations of the
rules by Montague's

counsel

and the

judge

that

were

apparently calculated to avoid Sew Easy's receiving either
actual or constructive notification,
Montague's

interpretation of the second sentence of

U.R.C.P. Rule 58 A(d) would totally vitiate and nullify any
substantive meaning to the first sentence in the paragraph
which was there before the second was added and would
directly

affront

the

simplest

and

most

basic

notice

requirements under due process.
The following applicable Utah cases when applied here
hold that Sew Easy received no due process conforming actual
or constructive notice of the entry of the default judgment
before March 8, 1989.

This conclusion is particularly valid

when viewed in the light that the judge never ruled on the
timely

objections

proposal.

to

the

default

order

and

judgment

If Sew Easy had examined the record every day

from the time of receipt of the proposal on September 27,
1988 until the judge signed and entered the same on October
26, 1989 there would have appeared neither a ruling on
objections nor the signed and entered default judgment.

5

The

judge also had a history in this case of never ruling on
(the discovery) motions.

See R. 41 to 50 and Montague Brief

pg. 10, top.
There are other facts in the record that would negate
constructive

notice

in this case under

the

precedents:

Marsh v. Utah Homes, Inc., 408 P.2d. 906;

Bish's Metal Company v. Luras, 359 P.2d. 21.

following

Plaintiff

filed a timely objection to entry of the proposed judgment
which was never ruled on and which the judge totally ignored
in later entry of the proposal objected to.

The judge had a

very long history in this case of never ruling on pending
motions which were at issue (Montague Brief pg. 10).
REPLY TO POINTS II AND IV
MONTAGUE'S ARGUMENTS THAT SEW EASY SOMEHOW WAIVED
BY SILENCE AN UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND OTHER DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IS
ABSURD AND CONTRADICTORY.
Montague cites totally irrelevant cases rather than
answering or distinguishing Sew Easy's cited cases holding
that an unliquidated damage default evidentiary hearing is a
jurisdictional requirement.

Montague's cited cases address

irrelevant, non-jurisdictional new issues raised after full
trial and on appeal for the first time.

They

include

default cases on liquidated damage claims where the trial
court has some discretion.

This clearly smacks of an

evasive admission tantamount to a confession of error in
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entry of the default judgment.

See Sew Easy brief Point II

pages 15 and 16 and Montague's brief Point II pages 17 to 20
and Point IV pages 21 and 22.
Montague's Point IV attempts to skirt the reality that
this court has clearly applied objective constitutional
judicial interpretive standards to U.R.C.P. Rule 55 (b)(1)
and (2) and concluded as the law of this state that when a
default judgment is for a sum which is uncertain as in this
case, an evidentiary damage hearing is absolutely required
even though the rule says "may".

Failure to do so in this

unliquidated damage case was a clear abuse of discretion and
denial of due process as a matter of the law of the Utah
cases cited on pages 16 and 20 of the Sew Easy brief.
REPLY TO POINT III
THE REPEATED ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS ACTIONS OF
THE JUDGE EVINCE THE TAINTED FRUITS OF ACTUAL BIAS
ARISING FROM THE CITED INCIDENTS OF CONFLICTS.
Montague's argument on page 21 of his brief that
there is "not one shred of evidence" of judicial bias or
prejudice is false.

The multiple direct conflicts of

interest are conclusively established.

The fact that the

judge, while so burdened, denied due process to Sew Easy on
at least four occasions shows that he was implementing his
malice.

In the cases cited by Defendant, there was no such

direct evidence of the conflict and certainly none showing
any or repeated acts of due process denial.
7

REPLY TO POINT V
MONTAGUE EVADES THE ISSUE THAT THE SPURIOUS DEFAULT
WAS ENTERED BY A CLERK UNDER FALSE PRETENSES AND
WITHOUT NOTICE OR HEARING AS REQUIRED.
Montague falsely implies that the default was entered
by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion after
notice and hearing on pages 23 and 24 of his brief.

Under

the rules and due process, the court has no discretion to
take any action against a party who has appeared as Sew Easy
did in this case and, most certainly the clerk has no such
discretionary powers in this regard as was done here.
Montague obtained the default from the clerk by false
representations that Sew Easy was served with process and
had not appeared, and thus obtained the absurd extra-legal
default.
Montague's whole argument in Point V under the rules
and due process should have been part of an initial motion
and memorandum for entry of a default properly served on Sew
Easy.

Then Sew Easy's brief arguments on page 2 3 of its

brief would have been in an opposition memorandum and due
process would have been satisfied on the initial default
matter.

Even if arguendo, in spite of Wells v. Wells, 272

P.2d. 167 (Utah 1954), the court would have reguired a reply
other than the complaint as necessary after notice and
hearing, it would have clearly been an abuse of discretion
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to have disallowed the filing of a (repetitive) reply and
entered a default judgment at that point*
Montague's argument Point VI, pages 25 and 2 6 again
fail to answer Sew Easy's point that the judge's dismissal
had to dismiss the whole suit or none of it.

The notice

said it that way, the suit would be dismissed and the
principle of inherent power also requires that the whole
suit be dismissed to clear it from the calendar under the
cases cited in both briefs.

It is undeniable that the

complaint and counter-claim are both part of that same suit
and should have both been dismissed or neither of the claims
should have been dismissed.

The arbitrary prejudicial

bifurcation without even litigating the issues raised by the
complaint as a reply to the counter-claim

is further

evidence of actual bias.
REPLY TO POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT PART OF THE SUIT AND THEN GIVING
DEFAULT ON THE COUNTER-CLAIM PART.
REPLY TO POINT VII
THE UNLIQUIDATED DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTRY IS VOID ON
MULTIPLE GROUNDS.
The defendant compulsively misapplies cases setting
standards for setting aside non-default judgments where
there have been trials on the merits with the apparent
objective of confusing the court.
9

Montague has effectively

admitted by failure to answer, that it ife the law of this
court that default judgments are not favored, are not in the
interests of fair play and that what is favored is a full
and complete opportunity for hearing on the merits of every
case.

See Sew Easy brief page 21.

Montague's arguments regarding due process in general
are not applicable and constitute a default in answering Sew
Easy's specific arguments in Point III of its brief. .PA
CONCLUSION
Montague

totally

failed

in answering

Sew

Easy's

arguments and this court should set aside the spurious
default judgment obtained by multiple denials of due process
M

in the interest of justice and fair play" and thus allow a

resolution on the merits of the complaint and counter-claim.
Signed this _JJ^~day

o&^ctolper,

1989.

David R. Daines '
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
DM-SC11
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four exact copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid in
Logan, Utah to Brad H. Bearnson, 56 West Center, P. 0. Box
525, Logan, Utah 84321, this 7ft^day of October, 1989.

David R. Daines
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